modeled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 19605 as sharing the pure public good of strategic nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is a pure public good when its benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable. However, alliances also rely on conventional weapons subject to both partial rivalry and excl udability. Consequently, conventional weapons yield benefits of an impure public nature, 1 and may be analyzed with a joint product model in which defense activities are viewed as providing multiple outputs, public and private. Empirical tests of the joint product model have been made by Sandler (1984, 1986) . Thies (1987) examined a host of preWorld War II alliances that depended on conventional armaments producing deterrence as well as impure public benefits such as damage-limiting protection in times of conflict. Based on a visual examination of some income and military spending data, Thies (1987) concluded that most of these alliances demonstrated behavior more in keeping with the joint product model for which allies are motivated by private excludable defense benefits. Our purpose is to examine the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente for the period 1880-1914. We present a joint product model and two-stage generalized least squares estimates of each ally's demand for defense over time.
History and Analyses of Pre-1914 Alliances
The oldest of the alliances was the Dual Alliance between Germany and AustriaHungary, signed in October 1879, and joined by Italy in May 1882, transforming it into the Triple Alliance. 2 The former remained in force until 1918; the latter ended with Italy's declaration of war on the central powers in 1915. The Dual Alliance pledged assistance if one party was attacked by Russia and at least neutrality if attacked by another power. The Triple AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOLUME 84 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1990 Alliance was directed primarily against France. It required aid by the other two members if one of them were attacked by France or became involved in a war with two or more other great powers and neutrality if one member initiated war with a nonmember. Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance was never considered firm enough to be reliable in the event of war. There is a voluminous literature on international politics before World War I. Most diplomatic histories, aside from personal memoirs, have focused on the structure of the system and in particular on the reasons why war broke out in 1914 (e.g., Hinsley 1967 and Schroeder 1976) . The most-cited factor is the alleged decline in the fluidity of the alliance system and the changing objectives of the great powers. The quantitative literature on nineteenthcentury alliances has been mostly devoted to testing propositions derived from the balance-of-power model. Quantitative studies confirm, for example, that the pattern of nineteenth-century alliances was random (Li and Thompson 1978) . Despite the intellectual attention devoted to the pre-World War I system, there have been no attempts, aside from Thies (1987) , to explicate problems of intra-alliance distribution of defense effort.
Theoretical Model
The joint product model views the arsenal of each ally as providing multiple 1198 outputs that may be private (i.e., country-specific, such as protection of colonies), purely public (i.e., nonrival and nonexcludable, such as deterrence against attack), or impurely public between allies (i.e., partially rival and/or partially nonexcludable, such as defense in times of active attack). This public-private distinction concerns nonrivalry and nonexcludability of benefits between allies but nQt necessarily within each ally.
In the case of pre-World War I alliances like the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, conventional armaments, in the form of land and navy forces, comprised the arsenals. Such forces are subject to spatial rivalry in the form of thinning (i.e., fewer forces per mile of perimeter, or fewer forces per square mile of area), as more allies rely on a fixed arsenal and its troops. In this case, defense benefits display partial rivalry and cannot be considered to be purely public. Deployment decisions imply excludability for allies furthest from the troops and materiel. Since even conventional forces may deter a potential aggressor from attacking allied nations, some pure public benefits were nevertheless present in these early alliances.
Although the joint product model encompasses the pure public good model, the former may lead to vastly different burden-sharing behavior. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) demonstrated that the presence of pure public defense benefits implies that (1) the large, rich allies will shoulder the military burdens of the smaller allies; (2) the allocation of resources will be suboptimal with respect to the defense activity; and (3) free riding will occur as an ally reduces its defense commitment in response to an increase in that of the other allies.
The presence of joint products means that the consumption relationship of the jointly derived defense goods plays a role when analyzing free rider behavior. If, for example, the joint products are complementary in consumption (i.e., they enhance one another's marginal valuation), an increase in the other ally's defense output in the form of greater deterrence may augment an ally's own desire to provide defense owing to its need for the private component associated with its own military activity. An ally may therefore respond positively to an increase in the other allies' military activities. Moreover, defense benefits among allies will be shared according to the ratio of private and excludable benefit to total benefits derived from the military activity. Allies that receive relatively more private benefits will spend more on defense; hence, defense burdens among allies will be based in part on private benefit shares rather than economic size.
For alliances relying on conventional armaments, defense benefits are more likely to be complementary since troops and artillery deployed along one border cannot defend a spatially separated border elsewhere in the alliance. In fact, increased fortification of one ally's boundary may induce other allies to follow suit so as not to invite an enemy to direct the assault at the now-relatively-Iess-fortified perimeter. A negative externality is now at play when allies fortify their borders and territories-that is, the likelihood of an attack elsewhere in the alliance increases. Since the increased military activity of any ally also deters aggression from an adversary, a positive externality is also present.
We now sketch the formal theoretical model. Consider an n-country alliance dependent on conventional armaments. For a representative ally, let x stand for the private defense output, z for the public defense output, and q for the conventional military activity. The ally is indexed with an i, which is suppressed where possible to simplify notation. The joint product relationships in the ith ally are (2) where dx/ dq = f' > 0 and dz/ dq = g' > o and both f(q) and g(q) are strictly concave, twice-continuously-differentiable functions. The first derivative of f and g measures the respective marginal productivities of the military activity in providing a private output and alliancewide defense. The quantity of alliancewide defense provided by the other allies, denoted by Z, affects an ally's decision to build up its own defense. We will refer to the protection benefit derived from an ally's provision (of arsenal and/or troops) as a "spillin." It can be proxied by a physical flow variable (e.g., manpower per period). In total, the allies consume Z units of public protection, where
If the origin of spillin is important, spillins can be written as
where gj (.) relates the defense activity in ally j to the number of units of alliancewide protection added by this ally's activity, namely, Zj. In equation 4, gf > 0 and gi' < 0, for all j.
The preferences of a representative, though not necessarily identical, ally are depicted by a well-behaved, strictly concave, nonsatiable utility function,
where y is a private numeraire activity and T is a threat variable that could corr~ spond to the sum of the military activity in the opposing alliance. 3 If, however, the opposing nations are viewed differently by a potential adversary, threat would be the vector of military manpower of the allies in the threatening alliance. In either 1200 case, aU/aT = Ur < O. An increase in threat lowers utility. Substituting equations 1-4 into equation 5 allows us to express the utility function in terms of activity space:
where q-i = (q1,"" qi-l1 qi+lI ... , qn)' To derive an ally's demand equation for military activities, a resource or budget constraint, 1= y + pq,
must limit utility maximization, where 1 is national income, p is the relative costliness of the military activity, and the price of good y is normalized at a value of one.
Maximizing utility in equation 6 subject to equation 7 and to the constancy of q -i and T yields a set of first-order conditions (FOes) that can be used to derive an ally's demand for its own military activity. The vector q -i is held constant at the bestresponse level of the rest of the allies, since a Nash equilibrium underlies our representation of the game structure for the allies' interactions. A Nash equilibrium is achieved when each ally desires an allocation (ye, qe) that satisfies its own first-order conditions. Furthermore, at equilibrium all allies must be simultan~ ously satisfying their FOes. In essence, the best-response level for q -i is the equilibrium vector q"-i in which each component fulfills the respective ally's FOes. At equilibrium, the FOes implicitly define an ally's demand for military activity in terms of the exogenous variables;4 hence, this demand is q = q (I, p, q -i, ·n. (8) In the empirical section, equation 8 is estimated for allies in the two pre-World War I alliances. Since we do not have price data on the relative costliness of defense output as compared to private nondefense outputs, we are forced to drop p as an argument. This causes no bias, provided that relative prices remain constant over time. In equation 8, the comparative static derivatives oq/oI, oq/oqj, and oq/oT prove of interest. Based upon Murdoch and Sandler (1984) , these derivatives can be signed a priori in some special cases. The derivative oq/oI measures the effect of a national income change on an ally's demand for military activity. When defense is a normal good with positive income elasticity, this derivative will exceed zero.
The derivative oq/oqj indicates an ally's defense response to an increase in the j th ally's defense activity. Since each ally can receive potential spillins from n -1 allies, there are n -1 responses -that is, (jq/ oq j for j ' * i. The sign of these responses are positive when spillins are viewed as complementary to an ally's own defense efforts. H, however, these qs are viewed as substitutes, as in the case of pure public goods, this derivative is more apt to be negative or near zero. Finally, the derivative oq/oT depicts an ally's defense response to threat. When threat is perceived as significant and increasing, a positive defense response is expected.
The model disaggregates spillins by place of origin (e.g., Austria might respond differently to Germany than to Italy), but can be modified to allow spillins to be perfectly substitutable regardless of place of origin. Replace Yearbook (1879 Yearbook ( -1914 . Threat variables are lagged. one period (L *MIL) , since a threat must be realized before it is observed; and spillin variables are estimated (*MILE) as the first stage of the two-stage GLS procedure that will be described. Combinations of two or more countries are added to the variable label (e.g., LFRUMIL is the lagged combination of British, Russian, and French military manpower). Changes in alliance composition are detected by changes in slope coefficients. A dummy variable (DXY = I, when alliance between X and Y is in operation) records alliance entry or exit and is multiplied by the estimated military manpower of the country entering or leaving the alliance. Hence, DGR • RE, for example, is a dummy for the RussoGerman alliance multiplied by estimated RUSSian manpower. The coding of the dummy is lagged so that changes in the value of the variable only take effect after one full year of any change in alliance composition.
Estimation of equations 8 and 9 take the form *MIL = {(INC, SPILL, THREAT, SHIFT), where *MIL denotes q, INC .".,-.
The simultaneity of the country equations was dealt with by utilizing a twostage least squares process. The SPILL variables were estimated first (this corresponds to the "hats" over SPILL in equation 10), using as regressors the incomes of all alliance partners, the ally's own income, binary (intercept shift) dummies for any alliance in which the country entered or exited during the period (D**), and the exogenous threat of the opposing alliance (LGAIMIL or LFRUMIL). The linear estimates of SPILL were then used for the final estimation of equation 10, using GLS-ARMA (with first-order autocorrelation of residuals), since ordinary least squares estimations resulted in positive autocorrelation.
Results
Results for the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance are presented in Tables 1  and 2 , respectively. Since collinearity reduces significance levels, we place some emphasis on coefficients whose values are nearly significant. The positive income coefficient (significant in all cases except Italy) suggests that defense is a normal good. Aggregating the threat and SPILL variables proved unfruitful in some cases, because countries responded to different allies or opponents in different ways. Given the lack of rigidity in the prewar alliance system and the variety of different forms of understandings, this is not surprising. Threat has the expected sign in the majority of cases but is only significant for France. Where the threat sign is negative, it is not statistically significant and is in two cases (Russia reacting to the Triple Alliance and Germany reacting to Russia) limited to situations in which the countries in question had been on friendly terms even though they would eventually be in opposing alliances. Taking the period 1880-1914 as a whole, the positive spillin coefficients suggest little evidence of free riding between countries allied during some part of the period. France and Russia (free riding on one another) are the only exceptions. The slope shift coefficients, however, are predominantly negative (with the exception of France) and typically insignificant, indicating weak evidence of free-riding reactions to alliance formation.
Britain's positive reaction (Table 1) to both major allied groups throughout the period is consistent with the long-standing objective of "splendid isolation," regarding all other major powers as potential enemies. The positive coefficient on spillins (Le., FRMILE) is nearly significant and suggests complementarity of forces. A larger positive (but insignificant) coefficient is associated with the Triple Alliance. The negative and significant coefficient associated with the alliance slope shift for the Anglo-Russian Entente suggests some substitution of forces once the United Kingdom abandoned splendid isolation. The entente with Russia helped Britain by both relieving military pressure on Britain's Asian empire (Afghanistan) and by diverting German manpower to the East. In the case of France, likely substitution took the form of an agreed specialization of forces in the event of war with Germany. The coefficient on the Anglo-French Entente is, however, insignificant.
The equation for Russia disaggregates spillins by allies. In Table 1 , the negative and significant reaction to French military manpower is consistent both with free riding and the two powers' having no serious conflicts. After the Franco-Russian Alliance, a weak degree of complementarity is suggested as seen by the positive but in- In the case of the United Kingdom, the entente resulted in agreements that required France to assume the primary responsibility for the land war with Germany. The data confirm that the French army increased markedly in size after 1910, while navy manpower remained static. Given the location of Germany between France and Russia, neither of these allies' forces could substitute for one another, thus explaining the strong positive coefficient on DFR. RE.
For Germany, the threat from Russia is separated from that from France and the United Kingdom because Russia was less of a rival than the latter two entente allies: In Table 2 the sign on LFUMIL is consistent with this rivalry, but the coefficient is insignificant. A negative (but insignificant and near-zero) coefficient is associated with the Russian threat. Similarly, the alliance with Russia until 1890 had no significant impact on German military activity. For most of the period, Russia and Germany were on friendly terms. The positive coefficient on AIMILE indicates that a complementarity existed between the forces of Germany and those of its allies.
Austria's positive and almost significant response to its allies' manpower (GIMILE) suggests that Austrian forces were complementary to those of the other allies (Table 2 ). This finding is probably due to Italy's being more of an enemy than an ally and to the inability readily to substitute German forces for Austrian in Austria's main theater of interest, the Balkans, owing to transportation difficulties. Austria responds insignificantly to the threat posed by the Triple Entente. Neither Britain nor France presented any direct military danger to Austria. Given Italy's attempt to foster friendships in both alliances, it is not surprising that the Italian results in Table 2 are inconclusive. None of the coefficients are significant. Even though the results are poor, they are not inconsistent with the theory that makes predictions for "true" allies and enemies. In the Italian case, allies and enemies are impossible to distinguish, especially after the FrancoItalian neutrality agreement of 1900 and 1902. Conclusion tittle evidence of free riding was found, except for-France and Russia. Some free riding occurred in the latter half of the period as the alliances added members and cemented ties prior to World War I. The model used here could be extended to other areas of political inquiry. Many international problems (e.g., global pollution) could be explicated in the same fashion. In the American politics literature, interest groups have yet to be analyzed with the type of time series data that would provide a more accurate assessment of publicness problems than may be found in the usual static or cross-sectional tests. 
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